PHEA Bill - Judicial Review

And my majority making vote is

NAY

With that, 3/4 of the Supreme Court has decided that PHEA is unconstitutional, and shall be stricken from Parliament, and any hopes of lawhood.

The 1/4 remaining, the Lord-Chancellor's vote, is that of abstaining, as the Lord-Chancellor could not make it tonight, though a majority was reached without him.

Therefore, the majority statement is as follows:

The Parliamentary Head Establishment Act (PHEA), as found by Chief Justice Vladovaskia, alongside Justices Ruclax and Mons Igneus, has an innumerable amount of Constitutional assumption and flaw. Primarily, the largest of these flaws lies in the essence of the destructive force to the democratic security of the region as a whole. Outlined in Article 3, Sections I and II of the Constitution, the goals and duties of Parliament are outlined, stating that Parliament is to be a "forum of legislation," not a review board, as the Cabinet behaves as the secondary house of legislature. Furthermore, the "inherent imbalance" mentioned in the opening clause of the bill is never defined, leaving the purpose of the bill to be questioned, leaving its legal interpretation to be questioned. Moving to Section 1, Article I of PHEA, the government structure and outline is clearly defined in Articles 3, 4, and 5 in the Constitution, leaving no room for a party elected position to be fit over a region-wide Parliament. As it stands, executive subset departments or positions can be formed out of the power of the Cabinet, such as The Department of Culture, however, these positions or departments must be managed out of their legitimate parent, Constitutionally-elected organization, such as the Cabinet. In theory, a Head of Parliament could be elected by the Members of Parliament, however the position would only be a subsidiary of what power Parliament itself has. Leading me to the next point we found, Section 1, Article II of PHEA states that the powers found in the entirety of Section 4, are "derive[d in] all such power from the Internal Affairs office," the Internal Affairs office being the Minister of Internal Affairs. We would like to further exasperate by stating that these said powers are not held by the Minister of Internal Affairs, making it a legal impossibility for the Head of Parliament to have such powers. We also would like to acknowledge that under the same "administration" clause listed in Section 1, Article II of the bill, if the bill were to work, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Head of Parliament, and Chancellor would all have the power to veto, making a very self-destructive, triangular power-feud within the region. Following up on that note, listed in Article 2, Section IV of the Constitution, the Executive Veto is defined as only given to the right-elected Chancellor of the region, therefore making it an improper breach of government for any other position to have such ability. The phrase "given to" is to represent that only the Chancellor may hold this authority, as well as the term "Executive" to be used to further define use by only the Executive of Government, the Chancellor. Moving forward to tidy up, Section 1, Article III of PHEA is in direct conflict with Section 1, Article II of itself, as Article III contains a 'no influence from the Cabinet' clause, whereas Article II states that the Head of Parliament is "under the administration" of a Cabinet Minister. Moreover, Section 4, Article V of PHEA is very undescript, leaving no subject clause, never defining whether only the Head of Parliament cannot veto Constitutional amendments, or if the bill is restricting the Chancellor from rightly vetoing a Constitutional amendment. Either way, both clauses are over stretches of power that cannot be accomplished in a Parliamentary bill. In conclusion, this bill violates several Articles of the Commonwealth Constitution, and has been stricken from Parliament and any hopes of lawhood.

As a note from the Supreme Court, we would like to remind the citizenry that if they feel there is an overage of power within the Cabinet, and a lack of power within Parliament, that firstly, a bill which limits the productivity and strains upon the duty of Parliament probably is not the best solution, also there exists Article 3, Section III of the Constitution, which allows Parliament to keep the Cabinet in check via the impeachment of Ministers.

Thank you for your time, we ask that the Parliamentary Head Establishment Act be promptly moved off the Parliament Floor, and into the appropriate board. Any immediate spring-up of bills which inherent the legality and proposals of PHEA shall be treated as PHEA, and as such removed from Parliament, with a proper notarization from a Supreme Court Justice.